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ing. 0 Objections raised in O'Shea against injunctive relief would seem
applicable to these cases.70 An avenue into federal court, however, might
be found by maintaining that the injuries arising from denial of counsel
or pre-trial liberty are more clearly "irreparable" than those alleged in
O'Shea.7' An additional distinguishing fact in these cases was that the
applicable law was unclear.72 Nevertheless, the possibility of federally
enjoining state judicial misconduct, which may border on criminal cul-
pability, appears foreclosed.
WILLIAM BERGER
A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE UCC EXTENDS
FLORIDA'S POLICY OF DEBTOR PROTECTION
Irving Turk, president of Bob King, Inc., acted as co-maker in exe-
cuting a $35,000 note along with a security agreement to plaintiff-bank as
consideration for floor-plan financing of automobiles which the company
was selling. Before Turk ceased to be active in the corporation, he joined
Bob King, Inc., in substituting a note of $20,000 for the original one. The
bank continued to advance monies until an indebtedness of $36,336 was
reached. At that point the bank notified Bob King, Inc., took possession
of and then sold the pledged automobiles without notifying Turk. Since
only $17,881.52 of the alleged outstanding indebtedness was realized, the
bank sued Turk for the deficiency plus interest. A jury returned a verdict
of $7,490 in favor of the bank. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held, reversed: If the secured creditor repossesses and
sells the pledged goods, without notifying the debtor pursuant to Florida
Statutes section 679.504(3) (1971),1 the creditor forfeits his right to a
continue in Florida municipal courts. See, Wisotsky, The Status of Municipal Courts in
Florida, 48 FLA. B.J. 290 (1974).
69. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. Injunctions against the violations alleged in these cases would also seem to require
the daily "monitoring" of and potential interference with state court proceedings by con-
tempt hearings in federal court which were rejected in O'Shea. In addition, remedies other
than injunctive relief, such as federal habeas corpus, would appear available to the federal
plaintiff.
71. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Pugh v. Rainwater, .483 F.2d 778,
783 (5th Cir. 1973) expressly declined to rule whether loss of liberty through denial of the
right to a preliminary hearing fell within the "irreparable injury" exception to Younger.
72. The right to counsel cases cited in note 68 supra were prior to, and raised issues
which were finally disposed of, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 U.S. 908 (1972). Pugh, a case
of first impression, is now before the Court. 94 S. Ct. 567 (1974). The impermissible conduct
in these cases was "valid" under prior law and was, thus, more likely to recur if injunctive
relief was denied or to cease once a definitive statement of federal rights was rendered,
than the criminal conduct alleged in O'Shea.
1. The statute provides in part:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
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deficiency judgment against the debtor. Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank &
Trust Co., 281 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
At common law, the debtor's obligation was terminated upon re-
possession of the collateral.2 In the absence of special contractual pro-
visions, deficiencies after disposition of repossessed property were not
recoverable. However statutes which regulated both the creditor's sale
of repossessed collateral and the nature of the notice given to the debtor,3
provided that if all statutory requirements were met, the creditor was
entitled to receive a deficiency judgment.4
The Uniform Commercial Code has liberalized the statutory require-
ments for sale after default.' Sections 9-501 through 9-507 do not set
forth explicit rules and definitions,' rather, the Code provides the parties
with flexible standards under which to fashion their agreements. As a
result of this flexibility, two major constructions have developed which
purport to define the relationship between sections 9-504(2), (3), and
section 9-507.' One view treats the sections as mutually exclusive; the
other construes the sections in pari materia.
Courts which adhere to the theory that the statutes must be inter-
preted together maintain that failure to give notice is not a defense to
an action for a deficiency judgment where the sale is commercially rea-
sonable. Under this view a strict and literal reading is given to section
9-504(2) which states in part: "If the security interest secures an in-
debtedness, . . . the debtor is liable for any deficiency." 8 Section 9-507'
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor.
FLA. STAT. § 679.504 (1971); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504 [hereinafter referred to
and cited as UCC or the Codel. All citations are to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962
Official Text, as amended, 1966, and to the Code as adopted in Florida.
2. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 15 (1956) and the authorities cited therein.
3. See, e.g., UNIFORMI CONDITIONAL SALES ACT, §§ 19-22.
4. Id.
5. For example, while the basic outline has remained the same, the notice requirement
now calls for reasonable notice as opposed to ten days notice before public sale. For discus-
sion of reasonable notification, see A.L.I. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE FINAL REPORT (1971); see also Comment, Remedies on Default Under
the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as Compared to Remedies Under Conditional Sales,
39 MARQ. L. REV. 246, 258 (1956).
6. For example, the Code does not define "default," but leaves its definition to the
parties. See, e.g., Goodwin, Repossession and Sale After Default: An Old Remedy Under
Fire, 10 AM. Bus. L.J. 221, 223 (1973).
7. The pertinent sections to this discussion are: UCC § 9-504(3), which requires that
the disposition must be commercially reasonable and that notice must be sent to the debtor
of the creditor's intent to make such a disposition; UCC § 9-504(2), which sets out the
debtor's liability for deficiencies and the creditor's duty to account for any surplus, and
UCC § 9-507(1), which allows the debtor a recovery for losses occasioned by the creditor's
failure to comply with the above provisions.
8. UCC § 9-504(2).
9. UCC § 9-507(1) reads in part, "If the disposition has occurred the debtor or any
person entitled to notification . . . prior to disposition has a right to recover from the
secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part."
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allows the debtor to recover any damages actually incurred if caused
by the secured party's failure to comply with the requirements of section
9-504(3). Construing these provisions together the courts have held that
if the creditor fails to give notice to the debtor as required by section
9-504(3), section 9-507(1) provides the debtor with a remedy against
the creditor for any loss caused by the failure to give notice.'
This position was adopted in Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss,15
which held that a loss suffered by the debtor could be set-off against the
creditor's deficiency judgment.' That court separated the requirement
of notice in section 9-504(3) from the operation of section 9-504(2) by
interpreting the remedial aspects of section 9-507 into the provisions of
section 9-504.':' The reasoning behind this interpretation was expressed
in Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy:'4
Where reasonable notice of sale has not been given, the spirit of
commercial reasonableness requires that the secured party not
be arbitrarily deprived of his deficiency but that the burden of
proof be shifted to him to prove that the sale resulted in the
fair and reasonable value of the security being credited to the
debtor's account. 5
The only comfort to the debtor comes from a requirement that the
creditor show that a commercially reasonable disposition was made. 6
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted this theory in a case where
defendants purchased a used car, claimed it to be defective, returned it
within a few days, and were sued for the resulting deficiency after resale.
Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff, who
had failed to show that it received a commercially reasonable price for the
car, was unable to recover a deficiency judgment. 7 However, even where
10. Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972) ; accord,
Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co., 452 P.2d 87 (Alas. 1969) ; Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v.
Rone, 248 Ark. 665, 453 S.W.2d 37 (1970).
11. 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972).
12. "In view of this remedy, we are of the opinion the writers of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code did not intend that the creditor's failure to give notice would result in a
forfeiture of the creditor's right to a deficiency." Id. at 870, 496 P.2d at 969.
13. Id.
14. 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (Dist. Ct. 1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288
A.2d 872 (App. Div. 1972).
15. 114 N.J. Super. at 386, 276 A.2d at 404-05; see also Norton v. First Nat'l Bank, 240
Ark. 131, 398 S.W.2d 538 (1966); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super. 601, 171
A.2d 548 (1961).
16. UCC § 9-504(3). See Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d
966 (1972).
17. Vic Hansen & Sons, Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728 (1973). Sim-
ilar interpretations have been applied in Illinois, where the plaintiff failed to recover a
deficiency because he had not given proper notice to the debtor and had not otherwise
proved that the sale was commercially reasonable, Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App 3d 789, 291
N.E.2d 180 (1972), and in Colorado, where it was held that reasonable notice of sale is
not necessary to recover a deficiency judgment if the seller proves that the actual market
1004
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he receives a deficiency judgment, the secured party may still be liable
under section 9-507 (1) for any loss to the debtor occasioned by the sale
without notice. 8
The alternate interpretation demands compliance with the Code's
notice requirements as a condition precedent to recovery of any deficiency
judgment. Section 9-504 is viewed independently, notwithstanding the
remedial provisions of section 9-507. Section 9-504 requires that every
aspect of the disposition must be commercially reasonable and that rea-
sonable notification of any public sale, or the time after which any private
sale is to be made, shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor. 9
Section 1-203 further imposes on the creditor an obligation of good faith
dealing."' Only if these requirements are met does section 9-504(2) pro-
vide that the debtor is liable for any deficiency.2' This was the decision
of the court in the leading case of Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co.,'2 on which the Turk court relied heavily. More-
over, according to the provisions of section 1-103," since section 9-507
is not stated to be an exclusive remedy, it should be treated as merely
cumulative.
The notice requirements of section 9-504(3) have particular impor-
tance when viewed in light of section 9-506, which gives the debtor an
absolute right to redeem the collateral at any time prior to disposition.24
From this viewpoint, the purpose of notice is to enable the debtor to (1)
protect his interest in the property by paying the debt; (2) find a buyer;
or (3) be present at the sale and bid on the property, or have others do
value of the collateral was less than the indebtedness. Community Mgt. Ass'n v. Tousley,
505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1973).
Carrying the rule to the extreme, a court has reasoned that even if the disposition was
unreasonable, section 9-507 provides the debtor with a remedy in set-off or counterclaim,
but the creditor's recovery of a deficiency judgment is not precluded. See Abbott Motors,
Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35 (1964).
18. Community Mgt. Ass'n v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1973).
19. UCC § 9-504(3) requires that "[Elvery aspect of the disposition . . . must be
commercially reasonable"; and that "[U]nless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notifica-
tion ...of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private
sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to
the debtor."
20. UCC § 1-203.
21. UCC § 9-504(2). "If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is
liable for any deficiency." Id.
22. 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as
Leasco ].
23. UCC § 1-103. "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity .. .shall supplement its provisions."
24. UCC § 9-506.
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a
contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or before the obligation has been
discharged under Section 9-505(2) the debtor or any other secured party may unless
otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering fulfill-
ment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably
incurred by the secured party . . ..
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
so, to avoid its being sacrificed by a sale at less than its true value.25
Thus, when a debtor is deprived of notice (and consequently his absolute
right of redemption), courts which require notice as a condition precedent
to recovery of a deficiency judgment will not posit that if the sale was
commercially reasonable there was no injury to the debtor. They will
read the "commercially reasonable manner" requirement as general in
scope and effect and not as isolated from the conjunctive requirement
that notice be sent to the debtor.
2 6
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, faced with a split
of authority and no prior Florida case construing the language of section
9-504, chose the strict statutory construction and held that the notice
requirement is a condition precedent to recovery of a deficiency judg-
ment. In so holding it expressly adopted the reasoning in Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co. 7 Unfortunately for the
development of precedent in Florida, the court failed to mention the alter-
native interpretation although the briefs presented in the Turk case de-
tailed both positions.28 The court announced the new Florida rule by
summarily stating that "many other states have adopted this code and
the language is clear that before a secured party ...can obtain a defi-
ciency ...the debtor must be given notice of what is to occur. '29 Then
without reference to section 9-506, which asserts the debtor's right of
redemption,3" the court proceeded to say, "[T]his is as it should be
because the debtor in this instance, Turk, could have done many things.
... He was not afforded the opportunity to do anything."31
The court also stated that the reasoning in the case was adopted from
that presented in Leasco "to the effect that since deficiency judgments
after repossession of collateral are in derogation of the common law, any
right to a deficiency accrues only after strict compliance with the relevant
statutes. :2 A reading of the Leasco opinion readily shows the inaccuracy
of this statement. The Leasco court did state that the common law de-
feats the claim for a deficiency judgment upon the failure of the plaintiff
to follow the quite modest notice requirements of 9-S04. ' : However, the
25. Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App. 1966).
26. See Edmonson v. Air Serv. Co., 123 Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971) ; Braswell
v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); see also Skeels v. Uni-
versal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated and remanded, 335
F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964) (plaintiff given no opportunity to arrange other financing).
27. 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
28. This failure to review the two positions and explicitly set forth Florida policy
might well lead to future conflicts in the Florida courts.
29. 281 So. 2d at 536.
30. FLA. STAT. § 679.506 (1971), quoted in note 27 supra.
31. 281 So. 2d at 536.
32. Id.
33. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323
N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
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court then demonstrated how the same result was reached by a "textual
analysis" of the relevant sections of the Code:
The very section that affirms the right to a deficiency judgment
after sale of a repossessed article also describes in simple and
practical terms the rules governing dispositions as well as the
pertinent notice requirements. . . . The natural inference that
the right depends upon compliance is forcefully underlined
by the joining of the two provisions in one section.1
4
The Leasco court showed an awareness of the disparity of strength
between secured creditors and defaulting debtors and of their respective
resources for prosecuting lawsuits. It did not demand strict compliance
with the statutes only because deficiency judgments are in derogation of
the common law. The court also considered that if section 9-507 is the
only remedy, a debtor has after being stripped of his property and given
no opportunity to take step3 to recover it, he must, on his own initiative,
resort to the already crowded courts. Therefore, the court fairly requires
the stronger party to obey the law, keeps unconscionable practices at
bay, and protects the interests of the borrower. The court in Turk did not
discuss these elements in its opinion.
Turk's brief on appealFr' stated that the bank should be precluded
from obtaining a deficiency judgment because (1) no reasonable notifica-
tion of sale was given and (2) the automobiles were not sold in a com-
mercially reasonable manner. Yet the court only discussed the first of
these points.
There is a strong argument for making the reasonable notification
requirement mandatory. The requirement was designed to protect the
debtor, or at least allow the debtor to protect himself by insuring that
a reasonable price is obtained upon sale of the collateral. 6 However, the
court failed to specify how it reached its conclusion and this weakened
the effect of its decision. The court could have clarified the law of secured
transactions as it relates to the area of deficiency judgments without
notice to the debtor; but it failed to take advantage of this opportunity.
Even though the opinion lacks analysis, its value is its unequivocal state-
ment of a mandatory notice requirement for recovery of deficiency judg-
ments which will stand as a warning to secured creditors that they must
deal fairly with debtors before they may resort to the Florida courts.
PHYLLIS L. KOVOLICK
34. Id. at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
35. Brief for Appellant at 12, Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So. 2d
534 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
36. 281 So. 2d at 536.
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